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Restructuring the Courts:
In Search of Basic Principles for the Judiciary
of Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina
David Pimentel*

I. INTRODUCTION

While judicial reform projects are underway in many countries, particularly
in the developing world, it is unusual for the reform efforts to include a
complete restructuring of a court system which redefines the number, size, and
location of courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. A
court restructuring initiative in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, therefore,
broke new ground in its effort to divine the guiding principles for how many
courts are needed, where they are needed, and how many judges are required for
each of them. The report of that effort-entitled Restructuring the Court System:
Report and Proposal("Report")--has not, until now, been published in a way that
makes it available to those considering similar issues. This deficiency is
unfortunate, as the principles derived for that restructuring effort, both in terms
of the substantive criteria applied and the political issues anticipated and
managed, are instructive and worth preserving. This Article summarizes those
principles, recounts the Author's experiences and challenges in restructuring the
courts, and also attaches the full Report of the court restructuring team in
Bosnia and Herzegovina for the benefit of future efforts along similar lines.

Assistant Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law; BA, Brigham Young University; MA,
University of California, Berkeley; JD, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley; former project team leader, funded by the United States Agency for International
Development, of the Court Restructuring team at the Independent Judicial Commission ("IJC')
in Sarajevo in 2002. I would like to thank the members of the IJC's Court Restructuring team and
those who supported it both with comments and with leadership, particularly Stephanie McPhail,
Eija livonen, Eric Fr6jabue, Vesna Travljanin, Admit Suljagi6, Elmira Pagagi6, Mary Theisen, Sven
Marius Urke, Charles Erdmann, Peter Bach, and Rakel Surlein, in the preparation of the Report
attached as the Appendix to this article. Thanks to Jena Cauley for research assistance.
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II. BACKGROUND
The structure of any country's court system-specifically, the number and
location of courts-is rarely the product of a comprehensive exercise in central
planning. Court systems tend to evolve historically, with courts created on an ad
hoc basis, responding to economic growth and shifting demographics.' Once
created and organized, an existing court configuration will persist long after any
coherent justification has disappeared.2
Consider the map of the circuits in the United States Federal Court system.
The cluster of geographically small circuits in the northeastern part of the
country stand in almost comical contrast to the huge circuits of the West, which
consist not only of much larger states but, for the most part, more states in each
circuit.3 The population dispersion of the United States in 1891 undoubtedly
justified defining the circuits this way,4 but population patterns of the twentyfirst century no longer map the original circuit distribution. While adjustments in
the geographical boundaries of a circuit's jurisdiction have been made--as with
the split of the Eighth Circuit to form the new Tenth Circuit in 1929' and the
split of the Fifth Circuit to form the new Eleventh Circuit in 19816 -such

See generally Kermit Hall and Eric W. Rise, From Local Courts to National Tribunals: The Federal
District Courts of Florida, 1821-1990 (Carlson 1991) (explaining the division of Florida into three
federal districts).
2

3

4
5

6

It has been suggested that the reason Puerto Rico was made part of the First Circuit (otherwise
composed of New England states: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Maine) in
1915 is that Puerto Rican business was dominated by Boston merchants, an economic legacy of
the infamous "triangle trade" that connected Boston to Africa to the Caribbean. Whether or not
this is true, the jurisdictional connection between the two places has outlived any economic or
other apparent logical connection that may have existed at the time the jurisdictional lines were
drawn. See Manuel Del Valle, Puerto Rico before the United States Supreme Court, 19 Rev Jur UPR 1,
13, 21-22 (1984) (describing the importance of international trade between the northeastern
United States and Puerto Rico, and its regulation, in the years before Puerto Rico was added to
the First Circuit). But even this does not explain Puerto Rico's attachment to Boston and the First
Circuit, as it appears that by the end of the nineteenth century Puerto Rico's primary trade was
with New York in the Second Circuit. Id.
A good map of the configuration of federal circuits can be found through the Administrative
Office of the US Courts, Geographic Boundariesof the United States Courts of Appeals and United States
District Courts, available online at <http://www.uscourts.gov/images/CircuitMap.pdf> (visited
Apr 5, 2008).
Evarts Act (Circuit Court of Appeals Act), 26 Stat 826 (1891) (creating the United States Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals and organizing them into nine circuits).
An Act to Amend Sections 116, 118, and 126 of the Judicial Code, 45 Stat 1346 (1929).
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 94 Stat 1994, codified at 96 PL 452
(amending 28 USC § 41 by limiting the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction to Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas,
and the District of the Canal Zone and creating a new Eleventh Circuit with jurisdiction over
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia).
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changes are rare and can be exceedingly difficult to effect. An example of this
difficulty is illustrated by the decades-long protracted battle to split the Ninth
Circuit.,
Only once in a great while is there an opportunity to do a comprehensive
reassessment and completely redraw the map on court configurations, right
down to the trial court level.8 As a result of the rarity of such an exercise, there is
no significant body of experience, or other generally-accepted wisdom, to draw
upon in approaching it.
This was the dilemma that faced the international community in Sarajevo
in 2001-2002, as it assisted in the execution of institutional reforms to
implement the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in the former
Yugoslavia. The Independent Judicial Commission ("IJC"), established under
the auspices of the Office of the High Representative,9 had launched a major
initiative to reform the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A key element of that
initiative was a comprehensive restructuring of the courts." The problem was
where and how to begin such a project.
The European Union had pledged money to hire two experts to lead the
restructuring effort, but after circulation of the Terms of Reference on two
separate occasions-first in late 2001 and again in the spring of 2002---it became
clear that no such experts were available and that, in all probability, they did not
7

See generally Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final
Report (1998), available online at <http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/final/appstruc.pdf>
(visited Apr 5, 2008); see also Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals, Hearing on HR 62-498 before the Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (1999), available
online at <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62498.000/hju62498_O.htm>
(visited Apr 5, 2008) ("Comm on Structural Alternatives'); US Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Hearingon 'Revisiting Proposals to Split
the Ninth Circuit: An Inevitable Solution to a Growing Problem" (2005), available online at
<http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1635&wit_id=4726>
(visited Apr 5, 2008)
(testimony of Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain).

s

An examination of the Federal Courts of Appeals has been made within the last decade by the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, but this did not include
any consideration of the courts of first instance. See Comm on Structural Alternatives, FinalReport
(cited in note 7).

9

The Office of the High Representative ("OHR") was created by the Peace Implementation
Council ("PIC") created under the Dayton Peace Accords. Office of the High Representative and
EU Special Representative, Decision Providing the Independent Judicial Commission ('rCJ') with a
Comprehensive Mandate (2001),
available
online
at
<http://www.ohr.int/decisions/
judicialrdec/default.asp?contentrid=69> (visited Apr 5, 2008); see also Dayton Peace Accords
(1995), annex 10, art I(2)-II, 35 ILM 75, 146-47 (1996).
Final Report of the Independent Judicial Commission, Restructuring of the Regular Court System 95 (2004),

10

available online at <http://www.hjpc.ba/reports/pdf/final-report-eng.pdf>
2008) ("IJC Final Report").
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exist. After all, when was the last time anyone had done a comprehensive
restructuring of a nation's court system? What opportunity could there be for
anyone to become an "expert" in court restructuring?
In the end, the IJC's Court Restructuring team--a small collection of
national and international lawyers in Sarajevo--independenly developed the
principles and criteria for this project," without specialized expert advice or
input. It was a highly consultative process, however, drawing upon the advice of
experts in other aspects of judicial reform 12 and with considerable attention paid
to the views of stakeholders in the project. The resulting Report is a remarkably
straightforward document, somewhat deceptive in its simplicity. In truth, the
project was enormously complex and politically volatile; the simplicity of the
Report was part of the strategy for navigating turbulent political waters. Within
the Report, it appears that the IJC Court Restructuring team acted without
regard to, and perhaps even in ignorance of, the wide range of political factors,
political implications, and political repercussions (including ethnic tensions)
implicated and generated by the restructuring effort. In fact, the effort was
keenly aware of such factors, and after careful consideration and deliberation
over these matters, determined to write a report that made no mention of such
matters, but based all of its recommendations and conclusions based on simple
and straightforward criteria.
The Report was initially posted by the IJC on its website, and later on the
website of Bosnia and Herzegovina's High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council.
But the Report is no longer available online, and it is important that this work be
published where it can be available to others considering similar questions.

11 The team and its supervisors consisted of judges and lawyers from Finland, France, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, and the United States. It was also ably supported by national lawyers from
within Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the names of those involved, see note *.
12 The team includes veterans of reform efforts in Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and East Timor, as well as
principals in the earlier Judicial System Assessment Programme ("JSAP) in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a UN project to monitor and assess the judicial system in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
initiated by the Security Council of the United Nations. See Security Council Res No 1184, UN
Doc S/RES/1184 (1998); see also Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public
Information for the United Nations, Bosnia and Her~egoina-UNMIBH-Mandate(2003), available
online at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unnibh/mandate.html> (visited Apr 5,
2008) (explaining that the organization referred to in Security Council Resolution 1184 eventually
became known as the JSAP). JSAP's series of "thematic reports" set the stage for most of the
judicial reform that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years that followed. See, for
example, JSAP, Thematic Report IX POLITICAL INFLUENCE: The Independence of the Judiday in
Bosnia and HerZegovina, UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2000), available online at
<http://hjpc.ba/docs/jasp/pdf/TR%201X%/ 2Political%20influence.pdf> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
For a more complete description of JSAP, see the website of Bosnia's High Judicial and
Prosecutorial Councils, JSAP OJudidial System Assessment Programme), available online at
<http://hjpc.ba/docs/jasp/?cid=2444,1,1> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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While the analysis is most relevant in the setting of post-conflict, transitional
justice, it may have broader implications in more stable societies, including the
recurring question of whether and when to merge or to split courts to
accommodate ever-shifting demographics. The Report is, therefore, republished
here as Appendix 1. To place the Report in better context, and to understand
the political environment from which it sprang, some additional comments and
reflections are added below.
III. WHY RESTRUCTURE COURTS?
A legitimate threshold question when considering the restructuring of a
court system is why such a thing should be done. Undoubtedly, one of the main
reasons that comprehensive court reconfigurations are so rare is that there is
hardly ever a compelling reason to make them, and simple inertia makes them
nearly impossible to start. As long as the courts are functioning effectively, there
is little reason to tamper with them; and if they are not functioning effectively,
the best remedy is unlikely to be found in a complete restructuring of the courts'
territorial jurisdiction.13
The reason for restructuring the courts in Bosnia was usually articulated in
terms of efficiency. 14 There were too many courts and too many judges, creating
unsustainable cost burdens on already-strapped public budgets.1 " The donor
community in Sarajevo, particularly the Americans, shared this consensus that a
restructuring involving consolidation of courts and reduction in the number of
judges was necessary. 6 The vision was to create a "leaner, meaner" judiciary.
13

14

15
16

Even when the configuration of the United States federal courts has in fact been altered, as in
splitting circuits, the motivation for doing so has, at times, been dubious. For example, while no
one could defend the existing configuration of circuits, at least in terms of demographics, the
primary proponents of splitting the Ninth Circuit appear to have been motivated more by their
unhappiness with the liberal rulings of the Ninth Circuit than with addressing demographic shifts.
Accord Eric J. Gribbin, Note, Ca'forniaSpit: A Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit,47 Duke L J 351,
356 (1997) ("While the Senate broke with its long tradition of delay in circuit-splitting matters
with its dramatic appropriations rider, it acted too quickly and for the wrong reasons. The
proposal is borne of frustration with the circuit's perceived liberal leanings."). This example also
shows that such restructuring is likely to be unsuccessful. Because splitting the Ninth Circuit
would do nothing to alter the ideological orientation of the life tenured judges who sit in those
nine western states, court restructuring would be a blunt instrument, if it could be effective at all,
for addressing the critics' grievances.
See, for example, IJC Final Report at 97 (cited in note 10) (referencing the 2002 "reinvigorated
strategy" for judicial reform in Bi--, "which referred to restructuring courts and prosecutors'
offices in order to reduce inefficiency".
Id at 107-17.
This point was emphasized in repeated meetings between the author and Robyn Goodkind,
Senior Democracy Adviser, US Agency for International Development Sarajevo (one of which
was held at the IJC offices on March 20, 2002 and another in Ms. Goodkind's office on May 15,
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A second factor was the commonly held perception that small courts in
small towns--places where everyone knows everyone else--were more
vulnerable to ethical compromise, or at least to bias."7 It was hoped that larger
courts, located in urban centers, would be more likely to dispense justice evenhandedly.
A third concern revolved around the new courts established during and
after the war, which effectively institutionalized separation of the ethnic
communities, perpetuating the ethnic cleansing pursued and achieved by certain
parties to the conflict.' During the conflict, Serbs fighting for a greater Serbia
could not be expected to go to an area, or a court, controlled by Bosniak
Muslims to have their legal disputes resolved. The separatist Serb Democratic
Party formed its own government and parliament after leaving the BiH
parliament in 1992; that government established its own courts in Serbcontrolled areas in part to legitimize the Republika Srpska as a nation with
constitutional order. 9 The City of Mostar, deeply divided between ethnic Croats
and Bosniak Muslims, had parallel courts just a few hundred meters apart, one
serving the Croat side of town and another serving the Bosniak side of town.
Clearly the restructuring had to undo some of the court configurations that were
symbols of ethnic division; this step was critical to developing a viable long-term
peaceful coexistence of former combatants in post-war Bosnian and
Herzegovinan society.

17

18

19

20

2002) and with Richard Prosen, Political Officer at the US Embassy in Sarajevo during MarchOctober of 2002 (the first of which was held at the US Embassy in Sarajevo on March 13, 2002).
The author also met with Niina Lehtinen, Task Manager for the European Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights (representing the European Commission) on April 8, 2002 in the
IJC offices, where this viewpoint was also expressed.
IJC Final Report at 95 (cited in note 10) ("It is difficult for a judge to maintain independence, and
the appearance of it, in a small town where all the participants in the judicial process know each
other personally.... Entrenchment in the local community was perceived by OHR to be a
particular problem with respect to sensitive criminal prosecutions.").
This was a very sensitive subject within OHR, because its purpose was to facilitate the
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which by their very terms guaranteed some of the
ethnic separation the Serbs had fought for in the war. See Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 2 (cited
in note 9). See also note 44. On the other hand, building a foundation for a lasting peace required
every effort to ease the ethnic tensions.
Email message from Kar Kiesilainen, Deputy Director, Chief, Monitoring and Implementation
Department, Independent Judicial Commission 2001-02 (Feb 19, 2008) (quoting Tim Hughes,
Deputy Chief of the Monitoring and Implementation Department) (on file with author).
The city had, on its books at least, a third court covering the "Central Zone" in Mostar, a city of
less than 100,000 people, although that court never actually functioned for lack of a building. For
further explanation of the issues in Mostar, see IJC Final Report at 89-93 (cited in note 10).
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A fourth objective of the court restructuring project was to facilitate the
vetting of the judges themselves, providing a basis for reappointment of the
entire judiciary. The restructuring was a critical element in this process.
A. THE JUDICIAL VETTING AND REAPPOINTMENT PROJECT
The need to vet judges was driven by the widely-perceived pattern of
corruption and incompetence throughout the system, to which several factors
contributed.
A threshold issue concerned judges' compensation, which was minimal
considering the functions and responsibilities of the position. Judges were paid
so little (the equivalent of a few hundred dollars a month) that they needed other
sources of income merely to subsist. This, of course, created virtually irresistible
incentives for judges to exploit their official position for financial advantage.2 1
Even legitimate business opportunities, pursued on the side, were prone to
create conflicts of interest.
There were also concerns about the competence of judges, as it appeared
that some had been appointed due to political connections, quite regardless of
qualifications.22 It was perceived that some judges of marginal competence were
appointed during the war as well, not necessarily out of corrupt favoritism, but
simply because of the scarcity of competent candidates for appointment during

the conflict.

23

Even the most qualified, competent, and ethical of the judges in the courts
of Bosnia and Herzegovina-for they certainly were not all incompetent or
corrupti 4-- had been working for years in a system characterized by low
expectations. 2i The reform effort needed a completely new culture of high
expectations for judges' conduct, performance, and industry: an independent
judiciary that would be a cornerstone of the rule of law in post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina. A reappointment process, by which judges had to compete for
newly created judgeships, would help turn the page of history, creating a new

21

JSAP, Thematic Report IX at sec 4.4,15-17 (cited in note 12).

22

Id at sec 4.3, 14-15 (cited in note 12) (discussing how judges of marginal competence were
appointed based on political affiliation and loyalty).

23

Id at 14.

24

See IJC Final Report at 63 (cited in note 10) ("approximately 70% of the incumbent judges and
prosecutors were reappointed").
There were low expectations on just about every level. Judgeships were characterized by low pay
and relatively low prestige. Expectations of judicial fairness and impartiality were also minimal.
Many judges worked just hard enough to turn out their "quota" of court decisions each month; it
was common for them to come to work late and leave early. See, for example, JSAP, Thematic
Report IX at sec 3, 10-11 (cited in note 12).

25

Summer 2008

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

culture in the court system, inaugurating a new judiciary untainted by the flaws
or failings of its predecessor.
B. INTERNATIONAL RESISTANCE TO JUDICIAL
REAPPOINTMENT PROCESS
The proposed approach was to "sack" 26 all the existing judges and require
them to apply in order to be reinstated.27 Wholesale removal of judges without
cause, without proof of wrongdoing or incompetence, and without due process,
raised some concerns in the human rights community, however, which
contended that this approach would be inconsistent with Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. 8 In April 2002, the Council of
Europe, the guardian of that Convention, sent representatives to Sarajevo to
urge the High Representative to be less ambitious and to limit the vetting
operation to the removal of judges who, after being accorded full procedural due
process, 29 could be shown to be unworthy of their post.3"
Those who were closest to the issues of corruption in the Bosnian
judiciary, however, believed that the problems of corruption and incompetence
were so widespread and endemic that a far more comprehensive sweep of the
system was necessary.31 Judges' salaries had been increased dramatically, 32 not
only removing the economic pressure to take bribes, but also making these
positions very desirable, sufficient perhaps to attract better-qualified candidates.
A rigorous screening process for new appointments would allow the appointing
authority, a new High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, to weed out anyone of
26

27

The term "sack" is British slang, used widely in the international community during this debate. It
means dismiss or fire someone from employment. Its origin, by popular understanding, was the
traditional practice of giving a discharged employee a sack to pack his personal things in as he was
leaving the workplace for the last time.
IJC Final Report at 54-58 (cited in note 10).

29

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, 213 UN Treaty Set 221 (1950),
available online at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/O05.htm> (visited Apr
5, 2008).
Of course, no one spoke in terms of "procedural due process" as this is a phrase unique to

30

American jurisprudence. The preferred terminology in the international community for this
concept is "natural justice"; that is, they urge an approach that can be implemented in a manner
"consistent with principles of natural justice."
The author was present at the meeting which took place in OHR offices in Sarajevo on April 15,

28

2002.
31

32

For example, the Senior Deputy High Representative, Mathias Sonn, met with the Council of
Europe representatives on April 15, 2002 and expressed this view which reflected the consensus
and advice of IJC staff. Id.
The salary increases ranged from 2.7 to 4.8 times their previous levels. IJC Final Report at 115
(cited in note 10).
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dubious ethics or competence.33 This approach was considered far
superior--both more effective and more efficient-than trying to target the
individual judges suspected of wrongdoing or incompetence and attempting to
make the case for their removal. The latter approach would place a heavy burden
of proof on the vetting authority, would be costly in terms of both time and
money, and would be completely ineffective at redressing such problems as
35
34
nepotism and favoritism in appointments and mediocrity in performance.
The court restructuring project, therefore, provided a very convenient basis
for achieving the clean sweep without violating basic principles of human rights.
While dismissing a judge without cause and naming a replacement to that post
might arguably run afoul of human rights principles, eliminating a judgeship as
part of legitimate restructuring is not nearly as problematic. 36 Accordingly, the
High Representative could simply eliminate all the judgeships-effectively
removing all sitting judges-and then make appointments to new and different
judgeships with jurisdictions different from those that had previously existed.
These highly desirable posts--with greater powers, for the most part, and
with a far higher salary-would attract the best and brightest of the Bosnian
legal community. Additionally, the appointments could be reserved for those
who were above reproach, untainted by the more dubious aspects of the
judiciary's history or the war's legacy of ethnic oppression. It was, for example, a
common practice during the war, after ethnic cleansing drove people from their
homes, for these homes-particularly the nicer ones-to be claimed and
occupied by people in the ethnic group that remained in the area. 37 It was
determined, as a threshold matter in the judicial screening process, that judges or
judicial candidates who had profited by the forced evacuations in this way
should not be eligible for judicial appointment.38
The comprehensive court restructuring was therefore essential in the
creation of new and different judgeships. The old courts and their judicial posts
were to be eliminated and replaced with a newly configured judicial system, with
different jurisdiction and fewer judgeships. Judges who lost their jobs in the
33

See id at 54-60 (explaining the reappointment process in detail).

34

See Sections II.B and III.D.l.a.

35

See Sections III.D.l.b and III.D.A.c.
This idea was widely accepted in the international community in Sarajevo at the time, but its roots
may have been more diplomatic than substantive. By characterizing the project as a restructuring
for the purpose of reinventing the judiciary, the dismissal of sitting judges could be viewed as
merely a side effect of the larger reform project. It did not, however, alter the fact that lifetenured judges lost their positions.

36

37

Email message from Kari Kiesilainen, Deputy Director, Chief, Monitoring and Implementation
Department, Independent Judicial Commission 2001-02 (Feb 13, 2008) (on file with author).

38

Id.
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restructuring could still apply, and many of them, in the end, were selected for the
39
new posts; after all, they were the most qualified in terms of judicial experience.
Thus, the restructuring facilitated a "clean sweep" of the judiciary that retained
qualified and ethical judges while ridding the courts of both the weak and the
corrupt judges, without having to prove cases against each of them individually.
IV. HOW TO APPROACH THE RESTRUCTURING PROJECT
The mechanics of redrawing might be mistaken as a relatively
straightforward-if complex-enterprise, involving examination of distances,
populations, economic connections between regions, and existing geographical
and political boundaries. Any veteran of even the most simple court
restructuring efforts, however, will note that the associated political battles of
such a project provide the challenges that are the most daunting.' ° No local
politician or local populace wants to lose "their" court. The rhetoric of the
municipal leaders throughout the court restructuring process-particularly from
those facing closure of their local court-reflected their sense that the
community would be better served by having a "court of its own." This
argument, however, is a problematic one, as a court that is sensitive to local
issues and concerns is also a court that might favor local interests over outsiders'
interests, creating an uneven playing field against the visiting party. Diversity
jurisdiction in the US federal courts was premised on the fear and recognition
that out-of-state interests could be "home-towned" by the local court if they
were forced to litigate their cases in the state courts. The expectation that federal
courts would not indulge in such local biases was a basic principle in judicial
federalism. Consistent with these principles, Bosnian pleas for "a court of our
own"-in the aftermath of the ugliest ethnic conflict in Europe since World
War 11-were unpersuasive.
A. SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS
For the reasons set forth below, tremendous efforts were made to adhere
to objective criteria and to justify any difficult decisions with a simple and
straightforward application of such criteria. The Report itself goes into
considerable detail discussing the data used and the methodology adopted for
determining which courts should be consolidated and how many judges should
be required for each of them.41 It is not necessary to restate that detail here.
39

IJC Final Report at 63 (cited in note 10) (approximately 70 percent of the incumbent judges and

40

prosecutors were reappointed).
See, for example, Gribbin, 47 Duke LJ at 396-97 (cited in note 13).
Annex at § 1.4-1.6.

41
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B. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Judges and politicians throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina were highly

suspicious of the court restructuring project before it began. At a forum in
Sarajevo in April 2002 arranged by the Judges' Association of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, court presidents and ministers of justice from
throughout the Federation voiced their concerns that the criteria for
restructuring had not been articulated.42 They feared a nontransparent process,

perhaps driven by the invidious sentiments-pitting one ethnic group against
another-that dominated public discourse in the region both during and after
the war. Such fears were understandable; Bosnia and Bosnians had had little
experience with transparency in the making of public policy, or of any such

process being conducted without the taint of partisan or ethnic politics.
In any case, whatever court consolidations were proposed would prompt a

defensive reaction from those who stood to lose from the proposition, who felt
slighted when their local court was closed when one comparable, but in an area
dominated by a different ethnic or political group, was being kept open. The
potential for the court restructuring project to fan the flames of conflict was

enormous; it was essential that the project be approached in a way that did not
prompt such reactions. Judicial reform was part of a larger peace
implementation agenda and could not be allowed to undermine the larger
agenda it was supposed to be supporting. Some feared that it could not be
done.43
However, the restructuring was not abandoned. To minimize the risk of
the project's foundering over political sensitivities, the project adhered to several
key principles and strategies. These are summarized below.

1. Transparency
The only way this process could go forward was by being as open and
transparent as possible and by demonstrating how each decision was supported

42

43

This forum, which took place at Federation Ministry of Justice Headquarters in Sarajevo, is
referenced in the IJC Final Report at 98 (cited in note 10). In addition to the forum described in
the text, the author met separately with no fewer than twenty court presidents and ministers of
Justice, most of whom articulated these suspicions and concerns. A "court president" in Bosnia is
the presiding judge of a court, much like the "chief judge" in an American court. There were
multiple ministers of justice involved because each of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina had its own minister of justice, as did the Republika Srpksa. A "canton" is a
political jurisdiction, roughly resembling a "county" in the United States.
This concern-the impossibility of navigating the political waters to accomplish the court
restructuring-was expressed with vehemence at the April forum referenced above and was
echoed in many of the Court Restructuring teams' on-site meetings with local court presidents
and ministers of justice all across Bosnia in June and July 2002.
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by objective criteria. This was a daunting prospect in a complex society fraught
with ethnic and political strife. The Dayton Peace Accord itself only sharpened
the tensions, as it formally enshrined some of the ethnic division that the reform
was so eager to avoid.' All parties were likely to see ethnic or political motives
behind any court closure or consolidation decisions. The objective criteria that
dictated the decisions had to be clearly and openly disclosed.
2. Drawing Out the Critics with a Preliminary Report
The court restructuring team needed to focus the discussion and inquiry on
"the criteria" rather than on the unique circumstances of specific localities.
Extensive, open-ended consultation before producing any report would only
prolong the period of anxiety and suspicion, setting the stage for a round
condemnation of the report when it finally issued.
The court restructuring team, therefore, attempted to forestall that reaction
by publishing a preliminary report at the outset, announcing that extensive
consultation could follow. The hope was that the preliminary report could be
criticized as ill-informed or ill-conceived without damaging the project overall;
after all, it was only preliminary, issued with an open admission that further
background and consultation would be necessary. Criticism at this stage could
therefore be characterized as an aid, rather than a threat, to the project; indeed
the project actively invited criticism at this stage as a part of its overall
methodology.
The preliminary report was assembled in a matter of a few weeks by a small
team of judicial reform officers at the IJC, all of whom had experience dealing
with the problems and issues in the Bosnian judiciary,4" and then widely
circulated. It drew on commonsense notions for how to approach the question
of court restructuring, set forth the basic proposed criteria, and projected
probable outcomes for the courts and localities that would be closed and
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Under the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords, Bosnia was partitioned into two entities, largely
along ethnic lines. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995),
35 ILM 89 (1996) ("Dayton Peace Accord"); see also Department of State, Summag of the Dayton
Peace Agreement on Bosnia-HerZegovina, annex 2, (Nov 30, 1995), available online at
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/bosnia/daytonpeace.html> (visited Apr 5, 2008) (offering
a more concise and comprehensive statement of the content and import of the Dayton Peace
Accord). The "Republika Srpska," as suggested by its name, was an entity designed to be
governed by and for Serbs. This level of Serb autonomy in Bosnia is what the Bosnian Serbs had
fought for in the war and won in the peace agreement. It could not be dismissed or disregarded in
the peace implementation process, of which court restructuring was but one element.
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One of the members of the team, Stephanie McPhail, had been an author of the JSAP Themaic
Report IX (cited in note 12), and was intimately acquainted with the problems and weaknesses of
the Bosnian judiciary. For composition of the IJC's court restructuring team, see notes *, 11-12.
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consolidated under the application of these criteria. This report put everyone on
notice immediately about which courts were vulnerable to elimination and why.
3. Active Consultation with Affected Parties, with Emphasis on the
Criteria
Unsurprisingly, many parties were angered and frustrated by the proposals
for court closures and consolidations. In responding to this reception, the team
made a concerted effort to meet with every court president and minister of
justice to seek their input and comment and to visit every court proposed to be
eliminated, as well as every court that would be required to absorb the caseload
from a court slated for closure. Whenever angry protests were raised, the team
could respond calmly that the preliminary report was just a proposal, and they
were happy to be persuaded that the Final Report should be different, as long as
the ultimate action could be justified in terms of objective criteria. The team
could thus redirect the discussion away from sensitive political issues and back
towards the criteria themselves.
Because the consultations were done on the basis of the preliminary report,
and because they emphasized the criteria to be applied, they were focused and
productive. More protracted discussions took place over the fate of certain
courts whose failure to meet the criteria was disputed.46 These included meetings
and follow-up meetings, with mayors, court presidents, and other officials, both
at the locations in question and at IJC Headquarters in Sarajevo. The end result
of this procedure was that when the Report was finally issued, less than three
months after the preliminary report was circulated, it contained no surprises.
The criteria themselves-objective and quantifiable--had been fully aired, and
the conclusions drawn by the team could be clearly justified by their application.
While some disagreed with some of the conclusions-that, for example,
cultural, historical, or political realities should have been considered in such a
way as to keep a court open despite its failing to meet objective criteria-the
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There were many arguments raised for why the proposed consolidations did not make sense in
certain communities. In one case in Herzegovina, for example, one municipality, Ljubugki, had
been the traditional and historical center of the region, while a newer community not far away,
iroki Brijeg, had grown rapidly in recent years and was a larger area in terms of population and
caseload. It appeared at first that there was insufficient caseload and population overall to support
courts in both areas, and it was interesting to observe that when it came to deciding between the
two, the Bosnian members of the court restructuring team felt that the historical center court
should be preserved, whereas the international members of the team-lacking that sense of
istoric tradition that comes with growing up in a place-were all inclined to keep the court in the
newer, larger community. In the end, after extensive consultations with judges and other local
government officials in the affected areas, a compromise was reached, redrawing other boundaries
to create districts with a sufficient population and caseload base to justify the retention of both
courts. IJC Final Report at 99 (cited in note 10).
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restructuring project successfully avoided any significant criticism that it was
biased in any way or pursuing a political agenda of its own.4" It was probably for
this reason that there was so little backlash when the High Representative-after
only the slightest adjustments to the recommendations,48 which were made in
restructuring plan
consultation with the court restructuring team-imposed 4the
9
as a matter of law in a series of decisions shortly thereafter.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
The fact that the project succeeded-that is, that the court closures and
consolidation were ultimately implemented-and did not generate the predicted
maelstrom of political controversy, suggests the effectiveness of the strategies
employed: transparency, the release of a preliminary report, and active
consultation focusing on the appropriateness of the objective criteria with
affected parties.
It is also worth noting that this process did not require a long period of
time. The preliminary report was drafted in the course of three weeks and
circulated in late May 2002. Consultations with judges in ninety courts followed
through June and mid-July. The final Report, with recommendations, was issued
on August 15, 2002. The High Representative imposed the laws effecting the
changes on November 1, 2002.0 In some ways, the rapidity of the process, still
allowing for intensive discussion, may have provided the IJC team an advantage
by leaving insufficient time for those opposed to the project to organize any
effective resistance. If the project had languished over the course of a year or
47
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For example, the court president of Kozarska Dubica was bitterly frustrated by the closure of her
court. The court president and municipal leaders of Srebrenik were also very much frustrated.
While they made zealous pleas on behalf of their respective courts before the final closures were
announced, they did not come back to complain afterward. The municipality of Tomislavgrad
sent a letter of protest, but only in Maglaj was there a concerted effort to overturn the decision to
close the court; the political process in that canton considered exercising local control to reverse
the High Representative's decision but ultimately determined not to do so. See IJC Final Report at
100, 104-05 (cited in note 10).
Retention of the court in Zepee could not be justified by any of the objective criteria, but Zep~e
had been the source of particularly acute ethnic tensions in the past, and a previous High
Representative decision had made special allowances there to accommodate and to ease those
tensions. The initial draft of the report recommended the closure of the court in Zep&e, but the
High Representative's decisions on court restructuring, as described in note 49, made an
exception and spared the Zepee court. The final draft of the report, Annex C, notes the exception
made for the Zepe court.
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For the High Representative's decisions enacting into law the Amendements to the Law on
Courts in each of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the
Republika Srpska, see All High Representatives Decisions (Nov 1, 2002), available online at
<http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp?m=&yr=2002> (visited Apr 5, 2008).
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more, it may have appeared far more vulnerable to political opposition-the
short timeline projected a greater sense of vigor and inevitability. Additionally,
the expedition with which the project was carried out also sent the message that
this was a no-nonsense, objective, by-the-book, and by-the-numbers operation;
it came across largely untainted by implications of political or ethnic agendas.
As for the criteria ultimately adopted and relied upon for the restructuring
exercise, the Report speaks clearly. The criteria chosen-essentially population
data, history of case-filing statistics, and geographical distances-were entirely
objective. The data used was beyond significant dispute or debate because it was
obtained from official government sources. 5' A terse simplicity of analysis and
language in the Report was consciously chosen to give a robustness to the
recommendations and to create less room for attempts to renegotiate at the
margins. Subjective factors and political nuances--which can always be
questioned or debated-were consciously excluded from the final Report, where
every recommendation was supported by hard data.52
Other lessons can be learned from mistakes that may have been made in
the Bosnian court restructuring. The first was the reluctance to bring trusted,
reform-minded judges and ministers more deeply into the planning process.
They were consulted, of course, but mostly at arms length, with neither intensive
nor extensive involvement in the entire exercise. It became apparent quite late
in the process that a select number of the judges had much to offer in
formulating proposals and strategizing for success. In particular, the team
consulted judges on the estimated quotas-establishing workload expectations
for judges to determine how many judges would be needed for each court.5 3 It
was with hesitation and trepidation that these judges were brought to the table,
and their identity was carefully protected, in an effort to insulate them from
backlash from their colleagues. The creativity and honest helpfulness of this
group---selected with an eye to ethnic and geographic balance-was impressive,
suggesting that the project may have benefitted from their input at earlier stages
51 At the very least, the data had come from the very same local governments later aggrieved by the
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court closure decisions generated by applying such data to the objective criteria. It was harder for
them to criticize the decisions when they were the source of the data that-when applied to the
criteria-produced that result.
The project team was not ignorant of the more subtle issues. Indeed, subjective considerations
were frequently brought to the team's attention in the course of the project, by political advisors
to the High Representative as well as Bosnian politicians concerned about the project's broader
implications for pending political issues and forces. But the project team could not afford to let its
project become a tool for anyone's political agenda, however salutary. The credibility, and
consequently the viability, of the restructuring project depended on transparency with an
unimpeachable, objective basis for its conclusions, applying the same criteria, the same way, to
every court.
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See the Report at Sec 1.3 and Annex A.
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and on a broader range of issues. That said, protecting the anonymity of such
participants was of paramount importance, lest the project be perceived as the
personal agenda of any personalities of influence in the Bosnian legal or judicial
establishment. "Focus groups" involving such individuals might have been
useful, as that would have elicited their input without giving them power inand therefore blame for-the ultimate decisions.
The consultation process was carried out on an extremely swift timeframe,
so there was not time to meet with all interested parties. While it was deemed
necessary to meet with every Minister of Justice and every Court President
whose court was slated for jurisdictional changes, the team did not meet with
municipal leaders (for example, mayors). Some of these municipal authorities,
those from 2ivinice and Srebrenik, for example, became actively involved in the
consultation process anyway. It might have been wise to include them in the
process from the outset. Perhaps better consultation with municipal leaders
would have mitigated the negative reactions of the municipalities of Maglaj and
Tomislavgrad. 4 This conclusion is uncertain, however, as the municipalities
might only have been more agitated by meetings and consultations that did not
yield favorable results for them.
Less useful from the political standpoint, but more significant in terms of
meaningful input on the decisions would have been the ideas and thoughts of all
the judges. Again, the judges consulted were essentially the court presidents
alone. Had time permitted, it might have been helpful to conduct a forum of all
judges in each jurisdiction, rather than limiting consultation to the court
presidents. This process could have generated more and better comments about
the proposals, simultaneously giving the judges themselves a stronger sense of
participation in the process.
Particularly disappointing was the input received from the bar. Bar
Association presidents and a couple of prominent attorneys were consulted, but
they gave very little productive input. There was some evidence in the reserved
and carefully worded comments of the attorneys consulted that they may have
been afraid to voice opinions that might anger the judges; this is not surprising,
as the attorneys have very little to gain by expressing their opinions on these
topics and so much to lose-for example, the goodwill of the bench. It is not
clear how the project might have better tapped the practicing attorneys in Bosnia
on the questions of court restructuring, whether assurances of anonymity might
have been effective or not, but it was clear that the strategy employed in this
project failed to elicit meaningful support or advice from those who appear
before the courts.
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Finally, it is clear that a number of unique circumstances-circumstances
that may not be replicable elsewhere-helped this project. The High
Representative's power to impose legislation, and even constitutional
amendments, substantially weakened the local authorities' bargaining position on
issues of court reform. The High Representative's willingness to exercise that
power was no less vital to the success of the project. It is a rare circumstance
when that much political power is focused in a reform-minded individual. Most
often, power is concentrated among those invested in the status quo, unwilling
to push any kind of reform agenda. The fact that this was a post-conflict society
with an outsider wielding the power of reform in the implementation of the
peace agreement, therefore, made the reform opportunity unusual.5"
The project benefitted enormously from drawing upon the institutional
knowledge and preliminary work of the IJC, as well as the Judicial System
Assessment Programme. The "preliminary report" circulated in May 2002 was
quickly assembled, but it was not entirely uninformed. Indeed, if it had betrayed
a general ignorance of the realities of the Bosnian legal system, the credibility of
the court restructuring team may have been irreparably damaged, jeopardizing
the entire project.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the court restructuring project in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
successful in its stated purposes. The judicial appointment process proceeded on
schedule and the court consolidations were implemented over the next several
years. This success is remarkable for two reasons: first, the project was carried
out in a highly charged political environment, and second, it was done by a team
of professionals who, though resourceful and accomplished in their respective
fields, had neither experience nor precedent to draw upon in approaching the
restructuring task. The publication of this Article, with the Report attached, is
designed to ensure that the lessons learned are preserved for future reference.
Again, these lessons may be applicable in a wide variety of court reform
contexts, whether in terms of the substantive criteria used to justify a court's
existence or closure, or in terms of the approach taken to minimize political
backlash. How these lessons might apply to various judicial reform agendas,
foreign and domestic--indeed, the attempts to reform courts in the United
5

The situation is not, in fact, entirely unique, as the Author worked in South Sudan with local
officials to establish an entirely new court system, under similar post-conflict circumstances. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, signed in 2005, called for South Sudan to enjoy six
years of regional autonomy. There was no acceptable "status quo" here, as the South Sudanese
government was eager to throw off the Islamic court system that the Khartoum government had
long imposed. In this post-conflict environment, the people in power were highly invested in a
complete reinvention of their court system.
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States have certainly not been immune to politicization and partisan
squabbling---is a topic for other papers and, perhaps, other authors.
The approach taken in this instance-both substantive and procedural-is
not presented here necessarily as an ideal, but only as a record documenting
what was done in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Future efforts can learn as much
from the shortcomings of the Bosnian court restructuring as from the successes
achieved. On issues of court configuration, however, groups who are interested
in restructuring now have at least one source to look to, at least for ideas on how
to restructure, if not a guide that can be followed. Not least among the lessons
learned from the project is the simple fact no one was sure of at the outset: that
it can be done.
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